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SHOULD DECIDE?
Should severely defective newborns be provided lzfe-sustaining medical treatment?
This issue has triggered a rash of pubhc debate. State and private interests have
surfaced. This Note analyzes these interests and determines who is the proper
party to decide this life or death question.
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 127
II. WASHINGTON REACTS TO THE DEATH OF INFANT DOE ... 129
A. Presidential Reaction .................................... 130
B Health and Human Services Regulations ................... 130
C Congressional Action .................................... 133
D. Baby Jane Doe.: Implementation of the New Regulation ...... 134
III. PRIVACY: A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DIE ............. 137
A. The Right to Parental Autonomy .......................... 137
B In the Wake of Roe v. Wade ........................... 138
C Euthanasia Ater Quinlan .............................. 141
IV. COMPETING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS ...................... 145
A. The Child ............................................. 146
B. The Parents ........................................... 148
I. Financial Costs ..................................... 148
2. Emotional Costs .................................... 149
C The Physician .......................................... 150
D. The Ethics Committee .................................. 152
E . The State ............................................. 152
I. General Interests .................................... 152
2. Financial Interest ................................... 155
3. M innesota ......................................... 156
V . CONCLUSION ............................................. 158
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, neonatal mortality rates in the United States have de-
creased drastically, especially for prematurely born infants., Defective
children who would have died naturally in the past can now be kept
1. Between 1940 and 1980, neonatal deaths dropped from 28.8 per thousand live
births to 8.5 per thousand live births. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 77 (104th ed. 1984); see also Duff & Campbell, Moral and
Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 890, 890 (1973).
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alive for extended periods despite their medical problems. 2 Because of its
potential to greatly extend life, medical science faces a novel dilemma:
should efforts be made to save every child?3
Parents and physicians have traditionally made life and death deci-
sions for infants, but recently this has been changing. Parental auton-
omy in medical decisionmaking is being challenged, and physicians must
be increasingly cautious in complying with parents' wishes.
In Minnesota, no decisions to withhold treatment from infants have
been legally challenged. Biomedical ethics committees are frequently
asked for recommendations, but parents and the treating physician usu-
ally decide alone whether the patient should receive treatment,4 espe-
cially in cases of brain dead individuals or those in persistent vegetative
states. 5 Any such decision may soon be challenged by the federal govern-
ment on the basis of recent legal developments. Although ethics commit-
tees,6 physicians, and parents may render a reasonable decision, they
may have to fight expensive and annoying legal battles to defend that
decision. This could cause special problems in Minnesota, where medi-
cal facilities rank among the most innovative and advanced in the
country.
This Note presents the public response to the recent death of a Down's
syndrome infant who was denied life support and reviews the resulting
federal executive and legislative acts. The Note then analyzes the consti-
tutional right to privacy as used to assert an individual's choice between
life and death. It discusses the varying interests of the parties involved in
determining whether a defective infant should be saved: the child, the
parents, the physician, the ethics committee, and the state. The Note
concludes that the life or death decision should belong to the parents
who, along with the treating physician, are most intimately and perma-
nently affected by the child's life or death.
2. The reduction in the infant death rate is primarily due to dramatic improvements
in medical science. In hospitals where neonatal intensive care units providing specialized
technology are available, the infant mortality rate is only half that in hospitals without
intensive care units. Duff & Campbell, supra note 1, at 890; see also Longino, Withholding
Treatment from Defective Newborns." Who Decides, and on What Criteria?, 31 U. KAN. L. REv.
377, 379 (1983).
3. "Medicine's seeming ability to extend or preserve life against the greatest odds
inevitably requires that 'decisions . . . be made by human agencies as to who shall con-
tinue to live and who shall not .... . Longino, supra note 2, at 379 (quoting Manning,
Legal and Policy Issues in the Allocation of Death, in THE DYING PATIENT 253, 255 (1970)).
4. Oberdorfer, Medical, Legal Battle Swirls Around Comatose Patient, Minneapolis Trib.,
Feb. 5, 1984, at IA, col. 1.
5. Id. at 6A, col. 1.
6. The University of Minnesota Hospitals and the Hennepin County Medical
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II. WASHINGTON REACTS TO THE DEATH OF INFANT DOE
On April 14, 1982, the Indiana Supreme Court refused to order sur-
gery for Infant Doe, a child with Down's syndrome.7 One day later the
baby, who had been given no food or water, died.8 Although nourish-
ment and medical care are commonly withheld from severely defective
infants to hasten death,9 the death of Infant Doe, the first well-publicized
controversy of this nature, elicited a vehemently negative response from
the public and two branches of the federal government.O
The public and the media reacted strongly by denouncing the decision
not to treat Infant Doe and by seeking to prevent other defective infants
from suffering similar fates.II Although refusal of treatment in some
cases is common, 12 public opposition to this practice has become intense
only recently, since the death of Infant Doe. Perhaps this reflects the
phenomenon that Yale law professor Guido Calabresi noted with respect
to decisions regarding traffic safety: the public is willing to risk resources,
sometimes even lives, to save one known individual while allowing policy
to destroy many lives, as long as they remain anonymous. 13
The decision whether to let a defective child die, a subject previously
in the secret domain of physicians, 14 has come to the public's attention.
7. Initially, a lower court decided not to interfere with the parents' decision to with-
hold life-sustaining treatment. See In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County
Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1982). The Indiana Supreme Court refused to review the lower court
decision. For a procedural review of In re Infant Doe, see Kuzma, The Legislatlve Response to
Infant Doe, 59 IND. L.J. 337, 337 nn.6-7 (1984); Longino, supra note 2, at 381 n.30.
8. Wash. Post, May 1, 1982, at All, col. 3; Wash. Post, Apr. 17, 1982, at A1, col. 4.
9. "It is common in the United States to withhold routine surgery and medical care
from an infant with Down's syndrome for the explicit purpose of hastening death." Fost,
Passive Euthanasia of Patients With Down's Syndrome, 142 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2295,
2295 (1982). In a 1977 nation-wide survey, about two-thirds of the pediatricians asked
said that they would accede to a parental request to withhold treatment of duodenal atre-
sia in a Down's syndrome child. Id.
10. See id at 2295; see also Comment, The Legacy oflnfant Doe, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 699,
703 (1982) (Infant Doe's tragedy brought into focus the complex and highly emotional
issue of a defective child's right to care or to death). See generally Kuzma, supra note 7, at
377 (analyzing the legislative reaction to the death of Infant Doe and noting that Arizona,
Indiana, and Louisiana have enacted state statutes regulating the care of defective
infants).
11. See generally Comment, supra note 10, at 699.
12. See Brahams, Acquittal of Paediatrician Charged after Death of Infant with Down Syn-
drome, 2 LANCET 1101 (1981). Criteria that have commonly been used to decide whether
to withhold treatment include "humanhood," as defined by an I.Q. greater than 40, or the
capacity for a "sense of self." Comment, supra note 10, at 700. Dr. Raymond S. Duff,
physician at the special-care nursery of the Yale-New Haven Hospital, has said that the
criteria for care should be "the capacity to love and be loved, to be independent, and to
understand and plan for the future." Id. at 701; see P. RAMSEY, The Benign Neglect of
Defective Infants, in ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE 206 n.29 (1978).
13. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 18 (1970).
14. Nontreatment in certain situations has been practiced and advocated by the med-
ical profession for some time, but the public and professional silence on this subject has
1985]
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Although an infants' parents and siblings are most intimately affected by
the decision to withhold or continue food and treatment for the newborn,
the state claims a legal right to control this decision. Whether a child
shall be kept alive and at what cost is no longer a private decision.
A. Presidenti'al Reaction
On April 30, 1982, just two weeks after the death of Infant Doe, Presi-
dent Reagan wrote a directive to Health and Human Services Secretary
Schweiker and Attorney General French Smith.15 The directive stated
that "[r]egulations under [federal] law specifically prohibit hospitals and
other providers of health services receiving federal assistance from dis-
criminating against the handicapped."1 6 The law President Reagan re-
ferred to is section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.17 According to
section 504,
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by
reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be de-
nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any
program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service. 18
B. Health and Human Services Regulations
In March 1983, pursuant to its right to promulgate rules to carry out
section 504 and its amendments,19 the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) proposed a rule to address the issue of withhold-
ing food and medical care from defective infants.20 Through this rule,
been broken only recently. Robertson, Involuntaq, Euthanasia of Defective Newborns. A Legal
Anaosis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213, 214 (1975); see also Fost, supra note 9, at 2295.
15. Wash. Post, May 1, 1982, at All, col. 3; see also American Academy of Pediatrics
v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.D.C. 1983).
16. Wash. Post, May 1, 1982, at All, col. 3.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Two courts have disagreed with the President's applica-
tion of section 504. See United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984) (a
handicapped child may not be "otherwise qualified" under the terms of section 504 be-
cause the handicap is the reason why treatment is sought, and therefore cannot be ig-
nored); Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 401 (no indication that Congress intended section 504 to
apply to monitoring medical treatment of defective newborns).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
19. The head of each agency providing financial assistance may promulgate the regu-
lations necessary to carry out the amendments of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29
U.S.C. § 794.
20. The rule provided:
Pursuant to 45 CFR 80.6(d), each recipient that provides covered health
care services to infants shall post and keep posted in a conspicuous place in each
delivery ward, each maternity ward, each pediatric ward, and each nursery, in-
cluding each intensive care nursery, the following notice:
DISCRIMINATORY FAILURE TO FEED AND CARE FOR HANDI-
[Vol. I11
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the HHS Office for Civil Rights reminded the medical community that
section 504 and its implementing regulations2i clearly prohibit the dis-
criminatory failure, by a health care provider receiving federal financial
assistance, to feed a handicapped infant or to provide lifesaving treat-
ment. 22 The rule required federal financial assistance recipients to post
conspicuous notices in locations where newborn infants are cared for
23
and provided a hotline number to be called in reporting any violation.
The health care profession strongly opposed the rule.24 Public posting
of notices with the hotline number resulted in calls from disgruntled hos-
pital employees, ill-informed bystanders, such as parents of other infants,
and cranks. 25 When the calls were genuine, "Baby Doe squads" were
immediately dispatched to the hospital in question to investigate the
matter.2 6 No violations of the rule were found,2 7 but the appearance of
the Baby Doe squads upset parents of defective children as well as par-
ents of other infants.28 At least one set of parents removed their critically
CAPPED INFANTS IN THIS FACILITY IS PROHIBITED BY FEDERAL
LAW
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 states that no otherwise quali-
fied handicapped individual shall, solely by reason of handicap, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
Any person having knowledge that a handicapped infant is being discrminatorily denied
food or customay medical care should immediately contact
Handicapped Infant Hotline
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Washington, D.C. 20201
Phone 800- (Available 24 hours a day)
or
Your State Child Protective Agency
Federal law prohibits retaliation or intimidation against any person who
provides information about possible violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Identity of callers will be held confidential.
Failure to feed and care for infants may also violate the criminal and civil
laws of your State.
48 Fed. Reg. 9631-32 (1983) (emphasis supplied).
21. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1983).
22. Comment, supra note 10, at 705. Betty Lou Dotsan, director of the HHS Office
for Civil Rights, issued a letter to 6800 hospitals that received federal financial assistance,
intimating that failure to care for children like Infant Doe could subject the recipient to
possible termination of federal assistance. Id
23. Culliton, "Baby Doe" Regs Thrown Out by Court, 220 Sci. 479, 479 (1983) (6400
hospitals around the country ordered to post notices about care and feeding of infants).
For the text of the required notice, see supra note 20.
24. Culliton, supra note 23, at 479.
25. During the four weeks the first hotline was in operation, almost 400 calls were
received, many of which were "hang ups" and "cranks." Id
26. Id Each region was to identify a specialist for medical consultation and an alter-
native. These specialists would comprise the "special assignment Baby Doe squad team."
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ill child from the hospital, against medical advice, believing that their
child had received improper medical care.2 9 The American Academy of
Pediatrics challenged the hastily drafted rule, and on April 14, 1983, the
regulation was overturned for procedural reasons. 30 Since the first Baby
Doe rule was overturned, it has been amended twice, first in July 198331
and again in January 1984.32 Although much refined, 33 the newest ver-
29. Id at 480. Dr. Paul Rosenberg, attorney for the Strong Memorial Hospital in
New York, where a Baby Doe squad investigated a complaint, said that "[t]he parents of
one critically ill patient signed the child out of the hospital against medical advice" due to
concern for the child's care. Id
30. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395. The District of Columbia Court found the rule to be
invalid as arbitrary and capricious. Id at 403. It was not issued in accordance with the
public notice or 30-day delay-of-effective date requirements of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 703 (1982). Id at 400-01. The court did not rule on the plain-
tiff's claims that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to act, id at 401-02, or that the
regulation intruded without justification into family-physician relationships protected by
the Constitution. Id. at 402-03.
31. The amended version of the rule provides:
Pursuant to 45 CFR 80.6(d), each recipient that provides covered health care
services to infants shall post and keep posted in a conspicuous place in each
nurse's station with responsibility for each delivery ward, each maternity ward,
each pediatric ward, and each nursery, including each intensive care nursery, the
following notice, which shall be no smaller than 81h by II inches:
DISCRIMINATORY FAILURE TO FEED AND CARE FOR HANDI-
CAPPED INFANTS IN THIS FACILITY IS PROHIBITED BY FEDERAL
LAW
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 states that no otherwise quali-
fied handicapped individual shall, solely by reason of handicap, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
Any person having knowledge that a handicapped infant is being discrimi-
natorily denied food or customary medical care should immediately contact:
Handicapped Infant Hotline, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services
Washington, D.C. 20201, Phone: 800-368-1019 (Available 24 hours a
day), or Your State Child Protective Agency
Federal law prohibits retaliation or intimidation against any person who
provides information about possible violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Identity of callers will be held confidential.
Failure to feed and care for infants may also violate the criminal and civil
laws of your State.
48 Fed. Reg. 30,851 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.61). The rule further provides
that each recipient state child protective agency shall establish and maintain written
records of administration and procedures to assure that the agency utilizes its full author-
ity pursuant to state law to prevent instances of medical neglect of handicapped infants.
Id
32. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap: Procedures and Guidelines Relating
to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1623 (1984) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. § 84.55). The new rule encourages health care providers receiving federal finan-
cial assistance to establish Infant Care Review Committees (ICRC's). These committees
should include a practicing physician, practicing nurse, the representative of a disability
[Vol. I11
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sion of the rule retains many of the provisions of the first version. 34
C Congressional Action
Congress responded quickly to the flurry of executive activity. On
May 26, 1982, Representative Erlenborn introduced the proposed Hand-
icapped Infants Protection Act of 1982, 35 an amendment to the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978.36
The amendment provided that withholding treatment or food be consid-
ered a violation of state child abuse and neglect statutes.3 7 The proposed
Handicapped Infant Protection Act went much further than the pro-
posed Health and Human Services rule because it did not limit regula-
tions to health care facilities and providers of health services receiving
organization, and other individuals. The rule provides that one member of the ICRC be
designated as "special advocate" for the infant. Id at 1623-25.
The rule also requires that informational notices be posted where nurses and medical
professionals who provide health care service to infants will see them. Two notices are
available. Notice A may be posted by hospitals having a policy consistent with the federal
law. It differs from notice B only in that the hospital's policy in caring for handicapped
infants is stated. Notice B must be posted by all health care providers who do not post
notice A. Both notices must state that federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of
handicap. Each notice provides:
[N]ourishment and medically beneficial treatment (as determined with respect
for reasonable medical judgments) should not be withheld from handicapped
infants solely on the basis of their present or anticipated mental or physical im-
pairments.
This Federal law, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, [applies to]
programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance. For further infor-
mation, or to report suspected noncompliance, call . . . (Identify appropriate
child protective services agency and telephone number) or U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS): 800-368-1019 (Toll-free: available 24
hoursaday. ..)
The identity of callers will be held confidential.
Id at 1651. The rule also states:
Within 60 days of the effective day of this section, each recipient state child
protective services agency shall establish and maintain in written form methods
of administration and procedures to assure that the agency utilizes its full au-
thority pursuant to state law to prevent instances of unlawful medical neglect of
handicapped infants.
Id
33. Compare 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 with 48 Fed. Reg. 9631 (HHS modified the notice
requirement and encouraged the establishment of Infant Care Review Committees).
34. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1651 (1984). The 1984 rule, like its two predecessors, requires
that notices be posted in infant care units in hospitals. See supra notes 20, 23, 31.
35. H.R. 6492, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). No hearings were ever scheduled for H.R.
6492. The bill would have amended the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (1982), to require the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect
to prevent practices in certain health care facilities which permit handicapped infants to
die through deliberate neglect, to establish judicial remedies to prevent such practices, and
for other purposes. Id
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (1982).
37. See Fost, supra note 9, at 2295. For analogous Minnesota statutes, see )fra notes
213-15 and accompanying text.
19851
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federal assistance.3 8 No hearings, however, were ever scheduled for the
bill.
On February 2, 1984, the House of Representatives voted to amend
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act by adding the Child
Abuse Amendments of 1983.39 The amendment largely reflects the re-
cently adopted rule of the Department of Health and Human Services4o
by authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Development to es-
tablish guidelines for neonatal care and procedures for reporting viola-
tions of the guidelines.
4'
D. Baby Jane Doe.- Implementation of the New Regulation
The first major challenge to the application of the HHS rule came in
October 1983, when Baby Jane Doe, a severely handicapped infant, was
denied surgery to close an opening in her spine.42 Baby Jane Doe was
born on October 11, 1983, in Stony Brook Hospital, New York. She suf-
fered from a number of serious physical problems including spina bifida,
a disorder where the bones and the covering of the spinal chord do not
close; microcephaly, an abnormally small head; and hydrocephalus, a
disorder where too much fluid accumulates in the cranial cavity.43 The
first pediatric neurosurgeon to examine her transferred Baby Jane Doe to
38. H.R. 6492, supra note 35.
39. The House of Representatives voted 396 to four to amend the Child Abuse Pre-
vention and Treatment and Adoption Act by adding the Child Abuse Amendments of
1983. 130 CONG. REC. H423 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984). Several provisions of these amend-
ments deal with neonatal care.
The bill provides that the National Center of Child Abuse and Neglect establish
procedures:
[T]o be followed by child protective service agencies, health care facilities, health
and allied medical professionals, such other agencies or individuals as a State
may deem appropriate, social service providers, and courts of competent jurisdic-
tion, to insure that nutrition (including fluid maintenance), medically indicated
treatment, general care, and appropriate social services are provided to infants at
risk with life-threatening congenital impairments.
H.R. 1904, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H390-91 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984).
The bill also mandates:
[T]he establishment of a procedure for any interested person to report to appro-
priate authorities any known or suspected instance of the denial of nutrition (in-
cluding fluid maintenance), medically indicated treatment, general care, or
appropriate social service to infants at risk with life-threatening congenital
impairments.
Id The bill also requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to publish proce-
dural guidelines to encourage and assist the states in establishing local health care mecha-
nisms for the review of care provided to infants at risk with life-threatening congenital
impairments. Id
40. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
41. See id.
42. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 560 (1983).
43. Id at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
[Vol. 11
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University Hospital for surgery to correct her spina bifida and
hydrocephalus.
4 4
Although surgery would have increased Baby Jane Doe's chances of
living longer, the procedures involved great risk of depriving her of the
limited function of her legs and could have resulted in urinary tract and
possibly kidney and skin infections. 45 According to some reports, Baby
Jane Doe was expected to be in continuous pain for the rest of her life.
4 6
Her parents consulted physicians, nurses, family members, religious ad-
visers, and a social worker before deciding that their daughter should
receive only conservative treatment. 4 7 The parents decided that surgery
would not be performed, 48 but that the child would receive proper nutri-
tion, antibiotics, and care and dressing of the spinal sac.
4 9
On October 16, 1983, A. Lawrence Washburn, a Vermont attorney
unrelated to the family of Baby Jane Doe, commenced a proceeding in
New York State Supreme Court. He asked the court to appoint a guard-
ian ad litem for Baby Jane Doe and to order University Hospital to per-
form corrective surgery. The court appointed William Weber guardian
ad litem for Baby Jane Doe and ordered that the surgery be performed.
50
On October 21, 1983, the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court reversed the trial court decision and dismissed the pro-
ceeding, finding that the parents "made an informed, intelligent, and
reasonable determination based upon and supported by responsible med-
ical authority." 5 1 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed this decision
on the grounds that the proceeding did not comply with a state law re-
quiring court approval for child neglect proceedings brought by anyone
other than a child protection agency.
52
While the state court cases were still in progress, the HHS received an
anonymous complaint that Baby Jane Doe was discriminatorily denied
medically indicated treatment (treatment from which she would medi-
cally benefit) based on her handicaps. 53 The New York State Child Pro-
tection Services, to which the complaint was referred, found no cause for
44. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1984).
45. Id at 147.
46. Mahoney, Do the Newborn Have a Right to Lte?., 8 J. Juv. L. 149, 153 (1984). In-
dependent medical experts did, however, suggest that Baby Jane Doe's incapacities would
not be severe enough to require institutionalization, and that she would be able to recog-
nize friends and relatives. Id.
47. Weber, 95 A.D.2d at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
48. The parents later permitted surgery to be performed to relieve the pressure on the
cranium by draining excess fluid from the brain to make the child more comfortable.
Minneapolis Star & Trib., Apr. 7, 1984, at IA, col. 5.
49. Uni'versity Hosp., 729 F.2d at 146; see also Mahoney, supra note 46, at 154.
50. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 146-47.
51. Weber, 95 A.D.2d at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
52. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63
(1983).
53. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 147. On October 19, HHS received a complaint from
19831
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state intervention.
54
In order to investigate the matter, the HHS requested University Hos-
pital to release Baby Jane Doe's records. Based in part on the parents'
refusal to release the records and in part on concerns regarding the de-
partment's jurisdiction and procedures, University Hospital refused to
comply with the HHS request. On November 2, 1983, the United States
government brought suit 5 5 on the basis that University Hospital had vio-
lated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 56 and section 80.6(c) of title
45 of the Code of Federal Regulations.57 The court concluded that the
reason for nontreatment had been the parents' refusal to give their con-
sent to the surgery and that the hospital had not discriminated against
Baby Jane Doe. The court granted summary judgment to the
defendants.58
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court on Feb-
ruary 23, 1984, 5 9 concluding that an infant suffering from multiple birth
defects would not ordinarily be considered "otherwise qualified" under
section 504,60 and that neither the language of the Rehabilitation Act
nor its history bring the medical treatment decision involving newborn
infants with numerous birth defects into its ambit.6 1
Although four out of five courts found their decision reasonable, the
parents of Baby Jane Doe were forced to defend that decision in three
state courts and two federal courts. The result was the harassment of
people who were already suffering the anguish of having a severely hand-
icapped child. In addition to the emotional distress, Baby Jane Doe's
parents had to suffer the financial consequences of extensive litigation62
at a time when they were already facing large medical bills.63 It seems
quite likely that the prospect of litigation expenses and emotional distress
will discourage parents of handicapped children from defending their
an unidentified private citizen that Baby Jane Doe was being discriminatorily denied
treatment. Id
54. Id.
55. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff, 729
F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
56. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
57. 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(c) (1983). This section requires recipients of federal assistance to
permit the responsible department official or his designee access to information pertinent
to ascertain compliance with the nondiscrimination provisions of 45 C.F.R. § 80.03 (1983).
58. Universz'ty Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607.
59. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144.
60. Id. at 144. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
61. Universty Hosp., 729 F.2d 144. The court went so far as to say that "[w]here the
handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if ever, be
possible to say with certainty that a particular decision was 'discriminatory.' " Id. at 157.
62. See id. at 144.
63. Minneapolis Star & Trib., June 15, 1984, at 15A, col. 1. The legal fees for defend-
ing against the government alone amounted to $88,000. Id
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rights, no matter how reasonable their decision.64
III. PRIVACY: A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DIE
Parents and individuals have previously found haven from state inter-
ference with family decisions in the constitutional right to privacy. This
penumbral right has been extended to encompass an individual's deci-
sion to decline medical treatment. After discussing the foundation of this
right to freedom of choice, this Note will address the question of who
should assert the right for the defective newborn.
A. The Right to Parental Autonomy
The right to make family decisions without state interference has been
recognized for some time. Society has long enforced parents' rights to
make family decisions to protect family strength and unity and parental
autonomy.6 5 This traditional common law right was clarified in a 1965
United States Supreme Court ruling.66
Griswold v. Connecticut6 7 established the constitutional right to make
family decisions without state interference.68 The Court found this free-
dom present in the penumbral right to privacy emanating from the first,
third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments.69 The Supreme Court later
extended the privacy right to some family decisions on child raising when
first amendment rights were at stake, even though they conflicted with
the state's interest.
70
Some state courts have found that the right to privacy permits parents
to authorize their healthy child to donate an organ, although the deci-
sion is not in the child's best interest. 7 1 Only where the state's right to
64. Id.
65. See Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Rirk: On State Supervention of Parental Auton-
omy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 648-49 (1977) (the law presumes the capacity and recognizes the
authority of adults to raise their children in accordance with their own beliefs and life
styles, and does not establish rules for child raising according to set standards or ideals);
Shatten & Chabon, Decision Making and the Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment for Defective
Newborns, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 59, 72 (1982) (there is a strong presumption in favor of paren-
tal autonomy and family privacy against coercive state intimidation).
66. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state interference in married
couple's use of birth control held unconstitutional). Even though the amendments differ
from each other significantly, the Court held that the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth
amendments protect the common interest of privacy, and that this interest constitutes a
fundamental right. Id
67. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
68. Id
69. Id.
70. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents permitted to take
children out of school before they reached the state's permissible age of removal).
71. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972). The parents of a 15-
year-old retarded child were permitted to let the child donate a kidney to her sister, an act
that was clearly not in the incompetent girl's best interest because there is always a surgi-
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interfere stems from an interest that far surpasses the interests of the fam-
ily should the state's interference be tolerated.
B. In the Wake of Roe v. Wade
Parents' rights to make decisions are not absolute, and the limits of
their autonomy are not entirely clear. In Roe v. Wade,72 the Supreme
Court established a constitutional right to terminate life before birth, at
least in the first trimester of pregnancy. 73 This right was recently af-
firmed in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduciwe Health.74 The constitutional
right to abortion is based on the right to privacy, and it takes precedence
over the state's "interest in preserving security and morality and guard-
ing society's value in the sanctity of human life."
75
Since the right to abortion was established, two new causes of action
have arisen. First, children have brought wrongful life actions against
physicians who failed to properly perform an abortion or negligently
failed to diagnose the fetus's defective condition where the mother could
have had an abortion. 76 Second, parents have brought corresponding
actions for wrongful birth.77 Although the child's wrongful life cause of
action has not been recognized in most jurisdictions, 78 several courts
cal risk and there could be trauma to the only remaining kidney. The act did, however,
benefit the family as a whole. Id; see also Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App.
1969) (parents could authorize kidney transplant from one minor daughter to her twin).
72. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
73. Id at 164.
74. 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2481 (1983).
75. Shatten & Chabon, supra note 62, at 69; see also Longino, supra note 2, at 381-82.
76. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (child's
wrongful life cause of action rejected where parents were not informed of option to detect
birth defects by amniocentesis, but child recovered damages for extraordinary expenses);
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980)
(child allowed to recover under wrongful life cause of action where genetic testing labora-
tory failed to detect that parents were carriers of Tay Sachs genes and child was born with
Tay Sachs syndrome); Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (parents recov-
ered for wrongful birth of infant with cystic fibrosis where physicians had failed to diag-
nose condition in an older sibling of the defective infant); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,
404 A.2d 8 (1979) (parents' wrongful birth cause of action recognized, but child's wrongful
life cause of action rejected, where parents were not informed of option to detect birth
defects by amniocentesis); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (parents of
genetically defective child born after negligently performed vasectomy and abortion pro-
cedures allowed to recover for its wrongful birth, but four-to-four split of votes in supreme
court failed to reverse trial court's determination that child had no cause of action); cf.
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (children may recover
damages from manufacturer where mother had been on medication causing birth defects).
77. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Schroeder, 87 N.J. 53, 432
A.2d 834; Berman, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8; Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1979); Speck, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110; Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d 460,
656 P.2d 483.
78. "[O]ut-of-state [California] cases have uniformily denied the chdd's right to bring
what has been commonly termed a 'wrongful life' action." Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 223, 643
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have conceded that a child would perhaps have been better off not hav-
ing been born at all than having been born with a severe congenital
defect.
7 9
The majority of courts have concluded that the parents of a wrong-
fully born child are harmed by its birth and can recover expenses and, in
some cases, damages for emotional distress.8 0 In general, the tendency is
to let parents decide whether or not to give birth to defective children
and to allow parents to recover from those who, through negligence or
otherwise, deprive ihem of that choice. Nevertheless, at least one juris-
diction, Minnesota, has banned causes of action for wrongful birth,a1 and
there is pressure from some organizations to eliminate causes of action for
unwanted children.
82
Some commentators suggest that the right to withhold treatment from
a deformed newborn parallels the right to abortion.8 3 The distinction
between an unwanted fetus and an unwanted defective infant may, in
terms of value of life, be insubstantial. An unwanted defective infant
may be more costly to maintain and less viable than an unwanted fetus,
and the unwanted fetus is potentially of greater value to society. The
need to sustain the life of a newborn child with congenital defects, espe-
P.2d at 955, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 129 (emphasis supplied). See Berman, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d
8; Speck, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110.
79. See Curender, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477; Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d 460,
656 P.2d 483. In Harbeson, the mother of a child with severe birth defects was not warned
that birth defects were potential side effects of a prescription drug she was taking. 98
Wash. 2d at 462-63, 656 P.2d at 486. In Curlender, a child born with Tay Sachs syndrome
brought a personal injury suit against a medical testing laboratory for failing to determine
that her parents carried Tay Sachs genes. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 814-15, 165 Cal. Rptr. at
479-80. Both courts granted relief under a cause of action for wrongful life. See id. at 830,
165 Cal. Rptr. at 489; Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 481, 656 P.2d at 496.
80. See generally Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 817-25, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 481-86 (survey
of wrongful birth and wrongful life law).
81. See generally MINN. STAT. § 145.424, subds. 1-2 (1982).
No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on
behalf of himself based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of an-
other, he would have been aborted .... No person shall maintain a cause of
action or receive an award of damages on the claim that but for the negligent
conduct of another, a child would have been aborted.
Id In view of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the constitutionality of this statute is
questionable. Speck, 497 Pa. at 85, 439 A.2d at 114. According to the Speck court, "Were
the plaintiff merely free to seek the abortion but unable to seek a remedy at law for inju-
ries consequent upon the negligent performance of that abortion, the right would be
hollow indeed." Id.
82. Reaves, Birth, To be Born, to Die: Individual Rights in the '80s, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1984, at
27, 28. A legal defense fund, Americans United for Life, advocates banning causes of
action based on the right to abortion. Id
83. Shaw, Death of 'Infant Doe': Why all the Surprie?, Wash. Post, May 15, 1982, at A19,
col. 2. The distinction between defective newborns, many of whom are premature, and a
fetus is vague. Should a healthy unborn child be aborted when a defective child which
has been born must survive at all costs? This question certainly casts doubt on the validity
of the right to abortion.
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cially defects related to extreme prematurity, may be illogical in view of
the right to abort a child with a similar prognosis at an earlier stage of
development:
If it is permissible to abort a defective fetus, even after it is viable, the
issue is whether it is impermissible to starve a defective newborn or to
deny it medical treatment. The only distinction between the defective,
viable fetus and the defective newborn is that the newborn is no longer
in utero.
8 4
The expansion of the right to abortion to include the right to withhold
care from living newborns is a double-edged sword. Arguably, an estab-
lished right to abortion by implication gives the right to withhold care
from unwanted newborns. 85 The correlation has been used, however, to
question the propriety of abortion. 86
As the ability to keep extremely premature infants alive improves with
advances in medicine, 87 the distinction between a defective newborn and
an unborn fetus grows increasingly attenuated because, according to Roe
v. Wade, the right to abortion depends on the viability of the fetus.88 The
problems raised by the potential viability of severely premature infants
or those lacking essential physical functions will have a bearing on the
rights of an in utero fetus, as well as the rights of multiple fertilized ova
that are disposed of after in vitro fertilization.
The problems resulting from granting protected status to embryos re-
sulting from in vitro fertilization are just beginning to surface. Recently
a couple had their embryos frozen,89 but died before the embryos could
84. Longino, supra note 2, at 386.
85. Id. The right to abortion is based on a constitutional right to privacy, namely a
woman's right to control her own body without state interference. See infra note 187.
Similarily, the right to make family health care decisions rests on a constitutional right to
privacy within the family. Certainly the act of obtaining an abortion is a deliberate termi-
nation of a potential life. It seems paradoxical that a decision to let nature take its course
in ending the life of a defective child, a life with much less potential, should not be pro-
tected by the right to privacy that protects parents seeking an abortion.
86. Shaw, supra note 83, at A19, col. 2. The correlation between abortion and defec-
tive newborn care can be used as an argument against the right to abortion. If the right of
privacy does not give parents the right to let their severely handicapped children die natu-
rally, it can be argued that a mother's right to intentionally terminate the life of her
healthy fetus should not be protected either. See id
87. The survival rate for very premature infants is rapidly improving. See generally
Tooley & Phibbs, Neonatal Intensive Care: The State of the Art, in ETHICS OF NEWBORN IN-
TENSIVE CARE 11, 13 (1976).
88. 410 U.S. 113. The state's legitimate interest in potential life becomes compelling
at viability because at that point the fetus is presumably capable of meaningful life outside
the womb. Id. at 163.
89. The freezing step has been added recently to the in vitro fertilization process. An
egg or several eggs are surgically removed from a woman's uterus. The egg is fertilized by
the man's sperm in a laboratory disk. This embryo is then frozen for preservation prior to
implantation in the woman. The embryo can be thawed for use months or years later,
and then placed in the uterus at a time synchronized with the woman's natural hormonal
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be implanted in the mother. 90 Although the embryos are stored in Aus-
tralia,9 1 their legal status in the United States is significant. Since the
parents owned substantial property in California, the embryos' legal sta-
tus must be decided there.92 More than the issue of inheritance is at
stake. Among the many ethical issues is whether embryos frozen and
abandoned or orphaned have a right to be implanted in another woman
and to live without the authorization of the parents.
93
C Euthanasia After Quinlan
With increasing frequency, courts must decide whether to treat or
withhold treatment in a life or death situation. The most renowned of
these cases is In re Quinlan.94 In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that the right to privacy, as defined in Griswold,95 encompasses a
patient's decision to decline medical treatment in certain circum-
stances.96 Since Karen Quinlan was incompetent to make a decision, the
cycle. Cope, 'Orphan Embryos' Create Dilemma for State Doctors, Minneapolis Star & Trib.,
June 25, 1984, at IA, col. 1.
90. Elsa and Mario Rios had enrolled in an in vitro fertilization program at Queen
Victoria Medical Center in Melbourne, Australia, in 1981. Several of the couple's em-
bryos were created outside the womb. The only attempt at implantation resulted in a
miscarriage. Two remaining embryos were frozen. Before another implantation could be
attempted, the couple died in a plane crash in Chile on April 2, 1983. Renfrew, Frozen
Embryos of Dead Couple Present Ethical Dilemma, Minneapolis Star & Trib., June 19, 1984, at
IA, col. 3.
91. More than 200 frozen embryos are stored at the Queen Victoria Medical Center
in Melbourne, Australia. Id
92. The couple had amassed an estimated seven million dollars from real estate trans-
actions in Los Angeles. Id. The issue of inheritance rights is further complicated by the
possibility that Mario Rios did not contribute the sperm that fertilized the embryos. This
alleged fact may enhance the inheritance rights of a son from Mario's previous marriage.
Cope, supra note 89, at 6A, col. 2.
93. See generally Cope, supra note 89, at IA, col. 1; Renfrew, supra note 90, at IA, col. 3.
An Australian scholarly committee of legal experts, philosophers, theologians, and scien-
tists (the Waller Committee) has recommended the destruction of the Rios' embryos. The
committee's decision centered on the Rios' failure to leave instructions concerning the
embryos' care either upon their divorce, or in this instance, their death. Minneapolis Star
& Trib., Sept. 4, 1984, at 4A, col. 1.
The use of "excess" embryos in laboratory experiments has been suggested. Dr. Rob-
ert Edward, a pioneer of the freezing technique, has experimented with more than a dozen
embryos to research such problems as birth defects. No similar experiments have been
reported in the United States. Cope, supra note 89, at 6A, col. 1. The Waller Committee
concluded that embryos up to 14 days old have no life or rights and approved of experi-
mentation up to that point. Minneapolis Star & Trib., Sept. 4, 1984, at 4A, col. 3.
94. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. deniedsub nom. Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
95. 381 U.S. 479. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
96. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. The court found that in Karen's case, the
lack of potential for resuming cognitive life sufficed to defeat any compelling interest the
state had in perpetuating life. Id; see also Mueller & Phoenix, A Dilemma for the Legal and
Medical Professions: Euthanasia and the Defective Newborn, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 501, 503 (1978).
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court concluded that a guardian could make that decision on her
behalf.97
Karen Quinlan, a twenty-two year-old woman living in a purely vege-
tative state,98 was totally dependent on a complex life support system. 99
Although termination of life support would not have conformed to the
contemporary standard of medical practice, 100 the court decided against
the medical standards and authorized disconnection of the life support
system.'01 Karen Quinlan was totally incompetent, yet the court held
that she had the right to refuse treatment on the grounds of privacy.102
Although Karen could not express the desire to terminate treatment, her
father, as guardian, was permitted to assert that right for her.10 3
Since Quinlan, the right to die has been affirmed repeatedly. Califor-
nia's Natural Death Act,10 4 for example, has established an adult's right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment when suffering from a terminal
condition. 105
97. Qui'n/an, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
98. Karen Quinlan was not brain dead, but was in a chronic and persistent vegetative
state. She had refleies like blinking, chewing, reaction to sound, and reactions to noxious
stimuli. Id at 25, 355 A.2d at 655.
99. Id Quinlan was being assisted by an MA-I respirator. "Attempts to 'wean' her
from the respirator were unsuccessful and [were] abandoned." Id
100. Id Several qualified experts who testified in the case said that "removal from the
respirator would not conform to medical practices, standards and traditions." Id It was
not specified, however, what those standards were.
101. Id. at 45-46, 355 A.2d at 666.
102. Id at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
We think that the State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to
privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.
Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the
State interest. It is for that reason that we believe Karen's choice, if she were
competent to make it, would be vindicated by the law.
Id
103. Id
104. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1984). Recognizing
that prolongation of life for persons with terminal illness may cause loss of dignity and
unnecessary suffering, the California legislature declared that an adult has the right to
authorize his physician to withhold life-sustaining care. Id § 7186.
105. California's Natural Death Act provides:
The Legislature finds that adult persons have the fundamental right to con-
trol the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, including
the decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in in-
stances of a terminal condition.
The Legislature further finds that modern medical technology has made
possible the artificial prolongation of human life beyond natural limits.
The Legislature further finds that, in the interest of protecting individual
autonomy, such prolongation of life for persons with a terminal condition may
cause loss of patient dignity and unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing
nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the patient.
The Legislature further finds that there exists considerable uncertainty in
the medical and legal professions as to the legality of terminating the use or
application of life-sustaining procedures where the patient has voluntarily and in
sound mind evidenced a desire that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn.
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The right to die has been tested in two recent California cases. In one
case, two physicians were found not guilty of homicide when they ac-
ceded to a family's wishes and removed a brain dead patient from life
support equipment.106 In another case, the parents of a brain dead in-
fant requested that life support not be removed.' 0 7 A temporary guard-
ian was appointed by the trial court, but before he could remove the life
support as the court advised him, the child's life functions ceased.0a In
the meantime, the parents and counsel for the child had petitioned the
California Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition against removing
the life support device.g0 9 In spite of the mootness of the case, the ap-
peals court concluded that the issue was important enough to decideO o
and held that it was proper for the guardian to have the life support
equipment removed from a brain dead child.,
Courts in other states have extended the right to die to incompetent
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients have a right to
expect, the Legislature hereby declares that the laws of the State of California
shall recognize the right of an adult person to make a written directive in-
structing his physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the
event of a terminal condition.
Id.
106. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
Clarence Herbert had suffered a cardio-respiratory arrest during surgery. Although he
was not brain dead, Mr. Herbert had suffered severe brain damage and was not expected
to ever recover from a vegetative state. Informed of the prognosis, his family drafted a
written request to remove the life-sustaining equipment. This, together with removal of
the hydrating and nourishing intravenous tubes, may have hastened his death. Id at
1010-11, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. Although Mr. Herbert had not made written request to
terminate life-prolonging treatment as required by California's Natural Death Act, see
supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text, the court found that the Act was not the exclu-
sive basis for terminating treatment, nor was brain death found to be a condition prece-
dent thereto. Id at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
107. Dority v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 3d 273, 193 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1983). Inves-
tigations disclosed that the parents of the 19 month-old infant may have been responsible
for the child's injuries. Id. at 278, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 291. Upon removal from the life
support system, it was estimated that the baby's heart would stop within ten minutes. Id.
at 275, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
108. Id at 276, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
109. Id, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
110. According to the court:
The novel medical, legal and ethical issues presented in this case are no doubt
capable of repetition and therefore should not be ignored by relying on the
mootness doctrine. This requires us to set forth a framework in which both the
medical and legal professions can deal with similar situations.
Id. at 276, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
111. Id at 280, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 292. The court specifically held that once brain
death has been determined, no criminal or civil liability will result if life support systems
are disconnected after parents or guardians have participated in the decision. The court
noted that "[t]his does not mean the hospital or the doctors are given the green light to
disconnect a life-support device from a brain-dead individual without consultation with
the parent or guardian." Id. at 279, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
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adults. In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Sa kewicz I 12 the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court defined the incompetent patient's right to re-
fuse treatment'1 3 and recognized the right of all persons to refuse
medical treatment in appropriate circumstances.' 4 A patient has an
"interest in the freedom to choose to reject, or refuse to consent to, intru-
sions of his bodily integrity and privacy."115 When an incompetent is
not permitted to refuse treatment, he is deprived of a right granted to
competent persons.
To protect the incompetent person within its power, the State must
recognize the dignity and worth of such a person and afford to that
person the same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in compe-
tent persons. . . . To presume that the incompetent person must al-
ways be subjected to what many rational and intelligent persons may
decline is to downgrade the status of the incompetent person by placing
a lesser value on his intrinsic human worth and vitality.' 16
The Saikewicz court's analysis indicates that failure to grant an incompe-
tent the right to choose through substituted judgment' 17 is discrimina-
tion against the handicapped.
The same sentiment has been echoed in several cases in which the
treatment of a handicapped person was at issue1 1 18 Since the legal trend
has been to extend to incompetent persons the rights other individuals
possess," t9 "[riecognition of this principle of equality requires under-
standing that in certain circumstances it may be appropriate for a court
to consent to the withholding of treatment from an incompetent individ-
112. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). Saikewicz was 67 years old and had the
mental age of a two-year-old. His mental retardation prevented him from communicating
verbally or responding intelligently to inquiries. Id at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
113. The court was particularly concerned with principles of equality that should enti-
tle an incompetent to the same right of privacy a competent person has. Id at 745, 370
N.E.2d at 427.
114. Id Specifically, the court held that there is a right to refuse treatment when treat-
ment would involve intrusions of bodily integrity and privacy. Id
115. Id
116. Id at 746-47, 370 N.E.2d at 428.
117. Substituted judgment is a common law standard whereby the court acts on behalf
of and "don[s] the mental mantle of the incompetent." Id at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
118. See Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982) (where newborn
child was ward of state, substituted judgment test applied in refusing heroic life saving
efforts); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 52 N.Y.S.2d 363, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981) (83-year-old priest who had expressed desire to receive no heroic medical treat-
ment before he became incompetent allowed to be taken off respirator); Leach v. Akron
Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980) (court granted husband's
request that life support system of his 70-year-old wife, in chronic vegetative state, be
terminated); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (removal of life support
systems for 69-year-old woman in chronic vegetative state; guardian's best judgment not
at odds with state interest); accord In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982) (substi-
tuted judgement test applied to allow guardian of mentally retarded person to choose
sterilization for that person).
119. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 747, 370 N.E.2d at 428.
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ual." 120 Although the Sazkewt'cz court dealt with a profoundly retarded
adult, its reasoning can be extended to defective infant situations because
defective infants are as incompetent and dependent as profoundly re-
tarded adults, if not more so.
In some circumstances the right to die is protected by the constitu-
tional right to privacy. The parameters of this protection, however, have
not been clearly defined. The Quzhlan court held that the right to privacy
"encompass[es] a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under
certain circumstances."121 The court stated that the patient's right to
privacy must be weighed against the state's interests in preserving human
life and in defending the right of a physician to administer treatment
according to his best judgment.12 2 The court stated that "the State's
interest weakens .. .and the individual's right to privacy grows as the
degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims."1 23 Because
she was never expected to resume cognitive life, Karen Quinlan's progno-
sis was very poor. The bodily invasions she endured included twenty-
four hour intensive nursing care, constant antibiotics, a respirator to help
her breathe, a catheter, and a feeding tube. 12 4 The court concluded that
Karen Quinlan's right to choose to terminate treatment, asserted on her
behalf by her guardian and family, outweighed any countervailing state
interests. 125
In cases involving defective newborns, it is often much more difficult
to draw the line between those who should receive care and those who
should not. The prognosis concerning a defective child-one having
Down's syndrome and an intestinal obstruction, for instance-is not nec-
essarily bleak, and the required medical procedure may not represent a
long-term bodily invasion. Such a child's right to privacy is not as
clearly defined as was Karen Quinlan's, and may not include the right to
die. Furthermore, as medical technology progresses, the standards of
treatment will advance and prognoses for formerly hopeless cases will
undoubtedly improve.12 6 But where nothing more than mere survival in
the barest sense can be anticipated, and where life is tenuously main-
tained by all that medical art has to offer, the right to say "no more"
should be respected.
IV. COMPETING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
Numerous conflicting interests complicate the defective child care is-
120. Id.
121. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 633.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
124. Id
125. See id.
126. See Comment, supra note 10, at 701-02. It is likely that medicine will continue its
trend of increasing longevity. See supra note I and accompanying text.
1985]
19
et al.: Life or Death in The Intensive Care Nursery: Who Should Decide?
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
sue. The child, the parents, the physician, and the state are all affected
by the decision whether to provide care for an infant or let the child die.
A. The Child
The defective child has an interest in its own fate. As a result of the
decision to provide or withhold care, the child will live with a severe
defect or die. A newborn, however, has no decisionmaking capacity of its
own. It is at the mercy of other decisionmakers. The right to decide for
the child should belong to someone who can interpret what the child
would want. This, of course, is impossible because there is no way to
determine the child's wishes. The child may have an interest, but that
interest is only what its parents, the state, and doctors say it is.127
Courts have generally based their decision of whether to order treat-
ment of defective infants on the child's best interest.128 Even when they
have refused to compel treatment, some courts have cited the child's wel-
fare as a reason for doing s0.1 29 It has been suggested, however, that
some courts actually consider the family's interests first, while professing
to act in the children's best interest.130
In deciding whether to save a life, a major consideration is whether the
individual possesses the qualities that make life valuable. Although the
quality of life criterion has been criticized,' 3' the decision to discontinue
life-saving or life-prolonging measures for a child that cannot enjoy an
acceptable quality of life may be a kindness rather than a cruelty.132 A
peculiar twist of human values requires that a suffering and incurably ill
animal should be mercifully killed to terminate its suffering, but that a
127. Marks, The Defective Newborn.- An Analytic Frameworkfor a Poliy Dialog, in ETHICS OF
NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE 97, 114 (1976).
128. See Longino, supra note 2, at 389; see also Weber, 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685
(court refused to order surgery for infant with spina bifida and multiple birth defects,
finding the parents' determination not to treat to be in the best interest of the infant); In re
Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1979) (court ordered surgery for infant with
spina bifida despite parents' choice not to order surgery).
129. See In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 949 (1980) (court upheld parents' refusal to permit a Down's syndrome child to un-
dergo cardiac surgery which usually had a 90% success rate); see also Weber, 95 A.D.2d 587,
467 N.Y.S.2d 685.
130. Longino, supra note 2, at 389. Longino cited In re Philh) B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796,
156 Cal. Rptr. 48, to support his theory that courts consider the welfare of the entire
family. Longino, supra note 2, at 389.
131. The Department of Health and Human Services rejects the quality of life stan-
dard on the basis that it is too easy to undervalue the lives of handicapped infants. See
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap: Procedures and Guidelines Relating to
Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1629-30 (1984) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84). The Department concluded that treatment must be provided if the
infant can medically benefit from it. Id
132. Doctors Duff and Campbell reported on the decisionmaking process for withhold-
ing treatment from 43 defective newborns. At some point in these infants' illnesses, they
were found to have acquired the "right to die." Duff & Campbell, supra note 1, at 892.
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human being in the same condition and unable to communicate its
wishes should be kept alive at all costs. Anything less than total dedica-
tion to the preservation of human "life" would be termed inhumane,
although the resulting life may be anything but human.
Children born with congenital malformations may lack human form
and the possibility of ordinary, psychosocial development. In many
cases mental retardation is or will be so profound and physical incapac-
ity so great, that the term "persons" or "humanly alive" have odd or
questionable meaning when applied to them. In these cases the in-
fant's physical and mental defects are so severe that they will never
know anything but a vegetative existence, with no discernible personal-
ity, sense of self, or capacity to interact with others. 133
One factor which must be considered in evaluating a child's interest is
the child's physical suffering. Some commentators argue that the poten-
tial for severe suffering and pain could make disabled infants "a burden
to themselves,"'134 and that treatment of the ailment may inflict even
more pain than the ailment itself.135
Shortly after the Infant Doe story was publicized, the Washington Post
published an article that illustrated the negative aspects of saving the life
of a severely handicapped infant.136 The parents of a retarded child
pointed out the problems such "saved" children must face.
Brian West was born in Newport Beach, California, nineteen months
before the Infant Doe case. He suffered from severe mental and physical
retardation caused by Down's syndrome, and an esophagus so deformed
that he could not eat.137 These symptoms were identical to Infant
Doe's. 138 Unlike the Indiana baby, Brian was kept alive despite his par-
ents' wishes to let him die.
He weighs only 16 pounds and cannot walk, talk or eat. He has had
two major operations, one heart failure, collapsed veins, stomach acid
spills on his skin, regular injections of nutrients and antibiotics in
nearly every part of his body, several weeks of being bound hand and
foot, and has a tube permanently attached to his stomach so he can be
fed. 139
Brian's parents felt that a long life would not be in Brian's best inter-
est, but the ethics commission at the hospital where Brian was born de-
prived them of the decision whether to care for him.140 Because of the
expense and the risk of losing in court, they felt they could not contest
133. Robertson, supra note 14, at 246.
134. Eg., id at 253.
135. E.g., id
136. Mathews, Brian. Another Side in Debate Over Severe Birth Defects, Wash. Post, May 21,
1982, at Al, col. 1.
137. Id at A18, col. I.
138. Comment, supra note 10, at 699.
139. Mathews, supra note 136, at Al, col. 1.
140. Id. at A18, col. 1.
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the hospital's decision. Brian is now a ward of the state. 14 1
Although our society has always preferred life, with or without handi-
caps, to nonlife, the quality of that life cannot be ignored where the indi-
vidual has little hope of achieving meaningful "humanhood."14 2 The
beauty and value of life disappears when the law threatens defective chil-
dren with extended torture each time medical science develops a new
way to prolong the bare rudiments of life. 143
B. The Parents
The decision whether to care for a defective newborn or to let it die
has a powerful impact on the child's parents.144 The parents and siblings
will probably be affected all their lives.145 The parents must live with
the moral decision they have made, but they must also consider the emo-
tional and economic strains that a defective child would place on their
family. Permanent strains on family life and financial well-being must
be carefully weighed against the potential benefits of sustaining a child
that may indefinitely require substantial medical care.
[I]f the child is treated and accepted at home, difficult and demanding
adjustments must be made. Parents must learn how to care for a dis-
abled child, confront financial and psychological uncertainty, meet the
needs of other siblings, and work through their own conflicting feelings.
[Parenting] demands are greater than with a normal child, particularly
if medical care and hospitalization are frequently required. Counseling
or professional support may be nonexistent or difficult to obtain ....
Finally, the anxieties, guilt, and grief present at birth may threaten to
recur or become chronic. 146
1. Fnanci'al Costs
The parents' financial responsibility upon the birth of a newborn is
substantial. Parents are usually responsible for the expenses incurred in
the care of their children. Where the child is born with congenital defor-
141. Id The potential legal bill was estimated at $20,000. Id.
142. See Duff & Campbell, supra note 1, at 892-93.
143. See Heymann & Holtz, The Severely Defective Newborn: The Dilemma and the Decision
Process, 23 PuB. POL'Y 381, 396-97 (1975); see also Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 402 (court ex-
pressed concern over administrative rule that required doctors and parents to undertake
heroic measures to preserve the life of an anacephalic infant lacking all or part of the brain
and with no hope of ever achieving even the most rudimentary form of consciousness,
despite the expense and a prognosis of certain death within months).
144. The parents have the interest of the family to consider. Their hopes have been
frustrated, and now they have to decide whether they will view the new addition to the
family as a blessing or a burden. Marks, supra note 127, at 117.
145. The HHS rule, however, excludes consideration of the negative effects of an im-
paired child's life on other persons, including parents and siblings. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622,
1652 (1984).
146. Robertson, supra note 14, at 257-58 (footnotes omitted).
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mities, the cost of health care alone is very high147 and may extend be-
yond the age when the parents' responsibility normally ends. 148 These
expenses are generally unaffected by medical insurance,14 9 and the fam-
ily must pay hospital bills in lieu of other necessary family expenses.
Even though the state may take responsibility for some of the costs, par-
ents will often be required to contribute to the child's support.150
2. Emotional Costs
When unwilling parents are judicially ordered to care for their defec-
tive infants, the emotional and social costs of raising these children often
far exceed the nurturing and caring pleasures that generally accompany
parenthood. "There is no joy in watching a child suffer."151 A severely
handicapped child can be a source of tremendous psychological stress.15
2
Although "the experience of living through a crisis is a deepening and
enriching one, accelerating personality maturation, and giving one a new
sensitivity to spouse, siblings and others,"'15 3 these benefits pale in com-
parison to the stresses that accompany the rearing of a defective child.
Families, especially those with other children, are concerned about be-
coming "socially enslaved, economically deprived and permanently stig-
matized."' 154 Families may find themselves in a state of "chronic
147. See Mathews, supra note 136, at A18, col. 6 (medical expenses for first 19 months of
Brian's life estimated to be $100,000, mostly paid by Medicaid); see also Duff & Campbell,
supra note 1, at 891 (in addition to medical expenses, a defective newborn threatens mar-
riage bonds and causes sibling behavior disturbances); Robertson, supra note 14, at 258
n.243.
148. Cf LaBelle v. LaBelle, 302 Minn. 98, 111, 223 N.W.2d 400, 408 (1974) (although
the court acting alone could not impose an obligation to bear the cost of children's educa-
tion beyond the age of majority, parties to a divorce can by stipulation agree to enter into
such support obligations).
149. Shatten & Chabon, supra note 65, at 68 (studies indicate that a family's day-to-
day costs for spina bifida care are substantial and are largely unaffected by medical insur-
ance). But see Robertson, supra note 14, at 258 n.243 (recent legislation in many states
requires insurance to cover children from the day of birth; even if the insurance policy
lawfully excludes coverage of deformed newborns, social pressures may force insurance
companies to cover newborns from the day of birth).
150. See Marks, supra note 127, at 117; cf. MINN. STAT. § 256.87 (1982) (parents re-
quired to contribute to the care of their children even if parental rights have been termi-
nated by a court).
151. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 69, 432 A.2d 834, 842 (1981). The Schroeder court
held that the defendant physicians had a duty to advise parents that their first child suf-
fered from cystic fibrosis. If the breach of that duty deprived the parents of their right to
choose whether to give birth to a second child with a high probability of suffering from the
same disease, the defendants could be held liable for the incremental medical costs of the
second child. Id at 70-71, 432 A.2d at 842.
152. Longino, supra note 2, at 386. The shock of a handicapped child's birth is often
followed by feelings of inadequacy, helplessness, anger, and guilt that may result in a
number of social and emotional problems. Id
153. Robertson, supra note 14, at 259.
154. See Duff & Campbell, supra note 1, at 892.
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sorrow,"55 a state of depression which lasts until their deaths or the
death of their defective infant. Chronic sorrow occurs frequently in these
cases, 156 and may cause marital problems among parents and behavioral
problems in siblings.15 7 Since it is usually difficult to find someone to
adopt a child with severe defects,158 parents are faced with the prospect
of being permanently tied to the care of a defective child.
Parents who must live with the prospect of watching their child suffer
should be allowed to make decisions concerning the child's future.
Before being allowed to intercede, the state should have the duty to show
that the parents' decision is wrong. It should not be the parents' duty to
show that their decision is right.1
5 9
C The Phys'can
The medical profession is also affected by the problem of care of defec-
tive newborns. Although a physician need not face the consequences of
his decision daily, as parents must do with their decision, he must con-
sider his moral interest in justifying his actions.
In addition to his moral interest, a physician has the professional re-
sponsibility to act according to his patient's best interests. The physi-
cian-patient relationship has always been viewed as one of special
confidence. The physician has a duty to behave reasonably toward his
patient,160 because he and his patient have a contractual relationship. 161
Once a physician-patient relationship is established, the physician has
the professional duty to act in the patient's best interests, whatever they
may be. 162 Should the patient protest, the physician has no duty to treat
155. The phenomenon of chronic sorrow frequently incapacitates the families of defec-
tive infants. Many parents who have a defective child suffer chronic sorrow regardless of
whether the child is kept at home or "put away." Olshansky, Chronic Sorrow: A Response to
Having a Mentally Defective Child, 43 Soc. CASEWORK 190 (1962).
156. Id
157, See Robertson, supra note 14, at 257.
158. See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 656.
159. "[S]ince the state should usually defer to the wishes of the parents, it has a serious
burden of justification before abridging parental autonomy by substituting its judgment
for that of the parents." In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 801-02, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51
(affirming trial court's dismissal of petition filed by juvenile probation department re-
questing that a Down's syndrome child be declared a dependent child of the court to
ensure that he would receive cardiac surgery which the parents refused and without which
the child would die young).
160. Survey, Euthanasia. Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 No-
TRE DAME LAW. 1202, 1226 (1973) (the physician has an affirmative contractual duty to
act within the reasonable scope of his professional duty).
161. Id.; see also Robertson, supra note 14, at 225.
162. The doctrine of abandonment recognizes that once a physician-patient relation-
ship has been established, the physician is obligated to attend the case as long as it re-
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if the patient's refusal is valid.163
The physician's professional interest may involve more than just his
individual professional relationship with the patient. The medical pro-
fession imposes standards on its members, and these standards may not
always correspond with the patient's best interest. The International
Code of Medical Ethics, for example, states that "[a] doctor must always
bear in mind the obligation of preserving human lifefrom conceptw'n."164
One concern expressed by some physicians is that future defective chil-
dren may suffer because of decisions to let defective children die now.
The state of the art of neonatal care could be severely compromised by
the death of the available learning and teaching material.I65 The ques-
tion here is whether the infant and his parents should be subjected to
great expense and suffering in the name of medical experimentation. 166
The defective child's parents perceive another interest of the medical
profession that may be adverse to the patient's financial interest. Dis-
gruntled parents may accuse the medical profession of forsaking the pa-
tient's interests for financial gain.167 Although the accusations may be
unfair, the possibility of a financial interest should be considered. Such
interests should not be allowed to take precedence over the interests of
the parents or the child.
The physician should always render a professional judgment with a
minimum of outside interference. He should not treat a patient against
his judgment merely because he fears damage to his reputation168 or
malpractice litigation.i69 The threat of a malpractice suit or criminal
sanctions may adversely affect an objective professional judgment.170 In-
stead of deciding on the basis of what is best for the child, the physician
may decide to treat because of the fear that, if he does not, someone may
report him to the police.17 The patient has a right to base his decision
163. Longino, supra note 2, at 391.
The recognized duties of physicians and hospitals to render care does not extend
to rendering care over the objections of one legally entitled to refuse, since a
doctor may only render care pursuant to valid, informed consent. . . . A valid
refusal of consent to treatment is a defense to a malpractice action alleging a
failure to treat.
Id.
164. INTERNATIONAL CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1949), reprintedin 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BIOETHICS 1749, 1750 app. (1978) (emphasis supplied).
165. Duff & Campbell, supra note 1, at 892.
166. Id. Understandably, parents who became aware of the specialist's concern for
teaching material thought their children should not become experimental subjects. d
167. One defective child's father thought that the doctors and hospital staff would
have been more reluctant to urge the child's treatment if there had not been a substantial
financial interest of the hospital at stake. Mathews, supra note 136, at A18, col. 6.
168. See Duff & Campbell, supra note 1, at 892.
169. See id.
170. See Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 46, 355 A.2d at 666-67.
171. See Brahams, supra note 12, at 1101.
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to refuse or accept treatment on the impartial professional opinion of the
physician. 172 An unbiased medical opinion is necessary to ensure "the
greatest possible protection to the individual in the furtherance of his
own desires,"' 173 which should be the physician's primary goal.
D. The Ethics Committee
The newly promulgated Health and Human Services rules recom-
mend that hospitals establish infant care review committees consisting of
a practicing physician, a practicing nurse, representatives from a disabil-
ity organization, and other individuals. 74 Those other individuals may
be theologians and attorneys, as the Quin/an court recommended.175 The
creation of such committees is not a new idea, and many hospitals al-
ready have them, 176 introducing an entirely new set of interests into the
decisionmaking process. There is no reason, however, to believe that such
a committee will be more able to make a proper decision than the par-
ents of the afflicted child in conjunction with its doctor.177 Parents who
have been properly informed by a competent physician are the most nat-
ural choice as decisionmakers on behalf of their own child.
E The State
1. General Interests
The state has conflicting interests in the care of defective infants. If
the state is involved in deciding whether a defective infant should receive
care, it must weigh these interests. Fundamentally, the state seeks to
172. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2491
(1983) (physician may best assist patient in exercising this fundamental right by assisting
patient in the decisionmaking process and then implementing that decision).
173. Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1975); see also Note, Com-
pulsoy Medical Treatment: The State's Interest Re-evaluated, 51 MINN. L. REV. 293, 294 (1966).
174. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap: Procedures Relating to Health Care
for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1651 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.55).
175. Quizlan, 70 N.J. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668.
176. In Minnesota, for example, numerous hospitals have such committees to make
ethical decisions if necessary. See Oberdorfer, supra note 4, at 1A, col. 1; see also 49 Fed.
Reg. 1629 (1984). See generally Teel, The Physician's Dilemma, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6, 8-9
(1975) (noting a physician's preference for ethics committees, but listing the committees'
disadvantages).
177. See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 655-56. Goldstein argues that "[n]o one has a
greater right or responsibility and no one can be presumed to be in a better position . ..
than a child's parents to decide what course to pursue if the medical experts cannot
agree." Id at 654. A committee, objective as it may be, does not have the insight into
family situations that parents do, and cannot evaluate the impact of its decision on the
other members of the family.. Certainly such a committee has no more information than
the parents and the treating physician, and the committee lacks the loving care that par-
ents put into a decision regarding their child's best interest.
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maintain order and continuity.178 Protecting minors and incompe-
tents, 179 enforcing laws against murder, 8 0 maintaining parental auton-
omy and family privacy,18i defending the physician's right to use his
judgment in administering medical treatment, 182 and preserving the
sanctity of life' 8 3 are all part of that interest.
Another fundamental interest that influences the state's decisionmak-
ing is the allocation of limited resources. This interest includes effectively
budgeting financial resources as well as determining the most beneficial
use of medical facilities. Since the state is interested in a fair and efficient
distribution of benefits and the promotion of health in the population as
a whole,' 84 it should not give disproportionate benefits to a few who will
never be of benefit to the state.185
According to the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,186 the
state's important and legitimate interest in the life of a fetus does not
become "compelling" until the stage of viability.' 87 To preserve the
unity and autonomy of the family, the state has generally let parents
make decisions for their children, especially incompetent children. Al-
though the courts have ordered unwilling parents to treat their children,
such cases have usually involved children who, with treatment, had a
good chance to live long and healthy lives.18 8 It is not totally clear that
178. Marks, supra note 127, at 115. This interest pertains to maintaining the status quo
with respect to desirable institutions like the nuclear family. See 1. at 115-16.
179. See Longino, supra note 2, at 392.
180. See Marks, supra note 127, at 116.
181. See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 649; see also Shatten & Chabon, supra note 65, at 72.
182. See Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
183. See id
184. Jonsen & Garland, A Moral Policy for Life/Death Decisions in the Intensive Care Nurseg,
in ETHICS OF NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE 142, 152 (1976).
185. Jonsen and Garland propose that "preference should be given those with the
greatest hope of surviving with maximal function." Id But see Childress, Triage in Neonatal
Intensive Care.- The Limitations ofa Metaphor, 69 VA. L. REV. 547, 557-61 (1983) (arguing that
the interests of all infants would be best met if priorities were determined by randomiza-
tion or queuing, unless there are major differences in their probabilities of survival).
186. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
187. The Court in Roe defined "viability" as the point at which the fetus is "potentially
able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." 410 U.S. at 160 (foot-
note omitted). The Roe Court, striking down Texas' criminal abortion statute, held that:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abor-
tion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate
the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the
potentialit of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion
except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preserva-
tion of the life or health of the mother.
410 U.S. at 164-65 (emphasis added).
188. Longino, supra note 2, at 394. See, e.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial
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the state should have an interest in sustaining the lives of defective un-
wanted children.
The state has traditionally dealt with the welfare of unwanted chil-
dren through its laws.189 A failure to provide necessary medical care to a
defective infant may be a criminal act: homicide, child abuse, or ne-
glect.190 When parental neglect causes the death of a normal child, the
courts have found the parents guilty of manslaughter.'9, Similarly, ac-
tive euthanasia causing the death of a severely handicapped individual
may result in a manslaughter conviction.192
When a severely handicapped infant dies from lack of care, the respon-
sible person rarely will be indicted on charges of homicide,' 93 perhaps
out of grudging respect for people who try to deal as best they can with a
hopeless situation. In the United States, no parent has been criminally
prosecuted for withholding treatment from a severely handicapped child
who died because of a decision made jointly with a physician.194 A re-
luctance to prosecute is particularly evident where parents were thought
to have "suffered enough" from the tragedy of having a severely ill
Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. dented, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (blood
transfusions ordered if necessary to save mother's life or life of unborn child, notwithstand-
ing that transfusions were contrary to mother's religious convictions); Hoener v. Bertinato,
67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1961) (custody of unborn child
awarded to county welfare department for purposes of having transfusion administered
immediately after birth); In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933) (court did not
abuse discretion in ordering removal of child's malignant eye where parents refused to
permit operation).
189. See Marks, supra note 127, at 116.
190. See generally Mueller & Phoenix, supra note 96, at 504-12 (discussion of criminal
liability for euthanasia involving defective newborns).
191. See, e.g., State v. Rupp, 120 Ariz. 490, 586 P.2d 1302 (1978) (parents who failed to
feed child for at least two days guilty of involuntary manslaughter); see also People v. Ogg,
26 Mich. App. 372, 182 N.W.2d 570 (1970) (mother guilty of culpable negligence suffi-
cient to support a charge of manslaughter for locking children in a small room without
windows, heat, light, bedding, food, clothing, or sanitary facility, where children died of
carbon monoxide poisoning during a fire).
192. See generally Survey, supra note 160, at 1205 (common law makes no exception for
factors such as humanitarian motive, consent of victim, or hopeless condition of victim,
which distinguish euthanasia from other forms of killing).
193. See Comment, supra note 10, at 710.
194. Reaves, supra note 82, at 31 (manslaughter charges against two California physi-
cians who discontinued intravenous feeding and removed respirator from comatose pa-
tient dismissed). In Great Britain, however, a physician who failed to treat a severely
defective infant was recently prosecuted. On February 2, 1981, Dr. Leonard Arthur, a
British pediatrician, was charged with the murder of a Down's syndrome baby whose
parents had expressed the wish that it die. The doctor pleaded not guilty and was acquit-
ted after two hours of jury deliberation. Brahams, supra note 12, at 1101. Although the
doctor could have attempted to keep the child alive, he was found not guilty of its murder.
The verdict may indicate a natural reluctance to criminally convict physicians for the
moral decisions they have made.
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child.195 In view of prosecuting attorneys' demonstrated hesitancy to
pursue these cases at this time,196 it seems unlikely that parents and phy-
sicians in the United States will face criminal penalties for withholding
care unless substantial changes occur in the law.
If the present failure to prosecute those who refuse to treat severely
defective infants is an accurate reflection of societal values, then perhaps
societal interference with parental decisionmaking is inappropriate. The
New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that when the right to privacy
permits termination of medical treatment, the state's power to punish the
taking of human life does not apply.' 9 7 This sentiment is also reflected in
other states, specifically California, which has a statute permitting adults
to refuse life-sustaining treatment.19 8 These legal developments indicate
that society values the right to die with dignity.
2. Financ'al Interest
The state must distribute a limited supply of resources among many
individuals.199 Recently, stringent cutbacks in funding of Medicare and
Medicaid services have fueled debate concerning the deployment of lim-
ited resources to achieve maximum benefits.2 00 If the state demands care
for a defective infant, at the very least it should finance the child's special
care requirements. 20' Ideally, where the state does not recognize the par-
ents' right to withhold treatment, it should provide the special financial,
physical, and psychological resources to make the life it saves real for the
child-and to the extent possible, to make unwanted children wanted
ones. 20
2
The care of a defective child may be very costly, and it is highly doubt-
ful that the cumbersome apparatus of the state could supply the intricate
needs of a defective child,203 no matter how much money is made avail-
able. Forcing the child's parents to care for it may create an unfavorable
environment for the child. Since the parents would care for the child
195. See Comment, supra note 10, at 711.
196. Id at 710-11.
197. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 51, 355 A.2d at 669-70.
198. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1984). This statute,
the California Natural Death Act, provides that any adult may, by written directive, di-
rect the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining equipment in the event of a terminal
condition, id. § 7188, and relieves from liability any physician or health facility which
withholds or withdraws treatment in accordance with the provisions of the Act, id. § 7190.
See supra note 105 (text of California Natural Death Act).
199. See Longino, supra note 2, at 393.
200. Nelson, Science, Politics Cloud Fate of Handicapped Infants, Minneapolis Star & Trib.,
Nov. 15, 1983, at IA, col. 1.
201. Goldstein, supra note 65, at 657 (the state has a responsibility to pay for usurping
parental autonomy).
202. Id
203. See Comment, supra note 10, at 712 (raising and arguing against possibilities for
child care through legislation).
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only out of a legal obligation, they might not provide the loving environ-
ment necessary for healthy development.04
Since the state must justify great expenditures to its taxpayers, the
value of the life saved must be balanced against the expense of saving it.
This is done frequently in the area of traffic safety, where anonymous
lives are risked for the sake of convenience and economy.205 The re-
sources expended in maintaining the life of a defective child are not
available for other important state uses, including the care of patients
with better prognoses. Money used to ensure mere survival for one child
could, perhaps, make another life much more productive. 206 Since the
state's resources are limited, the needs of defective children must be care-
fully weighed against competing state interests. 207
A defective newborn might well drain the state's resources and never
become a taxpayer himself. In such a case the state's interest in the
child's welfare may directly conflict with its interest in the efficient al-
location of limited resources. To date, society has been reluctant to
expressly apply a cost/benefit analysis to its life and death welfare pro-
grams, but there can be no doubt that the state faces internally contra-
dictory interests in such matters.
20 8
3. Minesota
In Minnesota, second degree manslaughter is defined by statute as cre-
ating an unreasonable risk, and consciously taking chances of causing
death or great bodily harm to another.209 Taken literally, this law could
apply to the death of a child for lack of care, and has been so applied in
the past.
2 10
In 1914, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a second degree man-
slaughter conviction against a healthy newborn infant's mother who
failed "to provide care, nurture, sustenance and medical assistance to a
child wholly incapable of supplying its own wants, and so caus[ing] its
death." 2' I There is no Minnesota case law dealing with a medical deci-
204. See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 657. "The law is too crude an instrument to nur-
ture, as only parents can, the delicate physical, psychological, and social tissues of a child's
life." Id
205. CALABRESl, supra note 13, at 17-18.
206. See Nelson, supra note 200, at IA, col. 1. The decision whether or not to care for
defective newborns should, perhaps, be influenced not by moral considerations, but by the
costs of surgery and long-term care in an era when even ordinary care is curtailed for some
individuals. Id
207. Longino, supra note 2, at 392-93.
208. Id at 393.
209. MINN. STAT. § 609.205, subd. 1 (1982).
210. State v. Staples, 126 Minn. 396, 148 N.W. 283 (1914). The court found that a
mother had assaulted her child, indicating affirmative steps taken by her to cause its
death. Id. This may have been a major factor influencing the court. See also infra note 211
and accompanying text.
211. 126 Minn. at 399, 148 N.W. at 284.
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sion to terminate treatment or care of a severely defective child.212
Minnesota statutes impose a standard of care on the parents of minor
children. A responsible parent or guardian's failure to supply a child
with the necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medical care is defined as
neglect if the parent is reasonably able to provide these needs.2 13
Minnesota's policy is to protect children whose health and welfare
might be endangered by abuse or neglect. 2 14 Upon finding that parents
have failed to provide their child with the care necessary for the child's
welfare, the juvenile court may, when petitioned, terminate all parental
rights.
2 15
The state acts even more directly with live-born infants that result
from an attempted abortion.216 Where the parents of such a child do not
212. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not decided any cases in the area of removing
life support from patients in a severely vegetative state, and there are few specifics in state
law which refer to similar circumstances. Oberdorfer, supra note 4, at 6A, col. I (citing
Probate Judge Melvin Peterson).
213. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 2(c) (Supp. 1983).
"Neglect" means failure by a person responsible for a child's care to supply a
child with necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care when reasonably able
to do so or failure to protect a child from conditions or actions which imminently
and seriously endanger the child's physical or mental health when reasonably
able to do so.
Id
214. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 1 (Supp. 1983).
The legislature hereby declares that the public policy of this state is to protect
children whose health or welfare may be jeopardized through physical abuse,
neglect or sexual abuse; to strengthen the family and make the home, school, and
community safe for children by promoting responsible child care in all settings;
and to provide, when necessary, a safe temporary or permanent home environ-
ment for physically or sexually abused children.
Id
215. MINN. STAT. § 260.221 (1982).
The juvenile court may, upon petition, terminate all rights of a parent to a child
in the following cases:
(a) With the written consent of a parent who for good cause desires to terminate
his parental rights; or
(b) If it finds that one or more of the following conditions exist:
(1) That the parent has abandoned the child; or
(2) That the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or ne-
glected to comply with the duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and
child relationship, including but not limited to providing the child with neces-
sary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for
the child's physical, mental or emotional health and development, if the parent
is physically and financially able . ...
Id
216. MINN. STAT. § 145.415, subd. 3 (1982).
(1) Unless the abortion is performed to save the life of the woman or child, or,
(2) unless one or both of the parents of the unborn child agrees within 30 days of
the birth to accept the parental rights and responsibilities for the child if it sur-
vives the abortion, whenever an abortion of a potentially viable fetus results in a
live birth, the child shall be an abandoned ward of the state and the parents
shall have no parental rights or obligations as if the parental rights had been
terminated pursuant to section 260.221.
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agree to accept parental rights, the child automatically becomes a ward
of the state according to section 260.221 of the Minnesota Statutes. No
petition is required to terminate parental rights in this situation.217
State termination of parental rights according to section 260.221 does
not, however, terminate all parental responsibilities. Although the chil-
dren receive financial assistance from the state, 218 the court may order a
parent to reimburse the county or state agency for the child's care.
219
The fairness of such a policy is questionable. If the state interest in pre-
serving the sanctity of human life is sufficiently great to overcome the
presumption of parental autonomy in deciding a child's welfare, then the
state should pay for that interest. 220 In Minnesota, the parents of defec-
tive children bear the costs, even in the absence of any parental right.
2 2 1
V. CONCLUSION
The question of who should decide whether to terminate life-prolong-
ing treatment of severely defective newborns has no easy answer. The
recently promulgated "Baby Doe Rules" 222 advocate that these decisions
be made by ethics committees in hospitals providing infant care. 223 Such
ethics committees already exist in many large hospitals.224 No one, how-
ever, is in a better position than parents to properly assess the situation
and make a decision consistent with their child's needs. 225
Federal regulations threaten to intrude upon a sensitive decision that
should be the sole domain of parents and the physician. 226 Most parents
choose to keep their defective children despite the many problems in-
volved.22 7 Those who elect no treatment for their children do so in the
child's and the family's best interests.228 The state's interest in the pres-
217. Id. Parental rights are terminated by this statute as though through court order
as per Minnesota Statutes section 260.221. The parents may, however, be ordered to
make a financial contribution. MINN. STAT. § 256.87 (1982).
218. MINN. STAT. §§ 256.72-.87 (1982) (providing for public welfare assistance).
219. MINN. STAT. § 256.87, subd. la (1982). "The court may, upon a motion or order
to show cause, order continuing contributions by a parent found able to reimburse the
county or state agency." Id
220. See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 657.
221. See MINN. STAT. § 256.87 (1982).
222. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
223. Id
224. The University of Minnesota Hospitals, for example, have a biomedical ethics
committee. See 49 Fed. Reg. 1629 (1984).
225. "No one has a greater right or responsibility and no one can be presumed to be in
a better position, and thus better equipped, than a child's parents to decide [what is best
for the child]." Goldstein, supra note 65, at 654-55.
226. See Another Harmful 'Baby Doe' Rule, Minneapolis Star & Trib., Sept. 23, 1983, at
18A, col. 1.
227. See Duff & Campbell, supra note 1, at 892.
228. "There is a substantial distinction in the State's insistence that human life be
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ervation of life is certainly not absolute, 229 and should not be allowed to
take precedence over the interests of those who are most intimately and
permanently affected by the life or death of a child.
saved where the affliction is curable, as opposed to the State interest where .. the issue is
not whether but when, for how long, and at what cost to the individual that life may be
briefly extended." Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
229. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 403.
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